Kicking up
dust in Kashmir
by Hassan Abbas
Reprinted from
The
Washington Times
June 14, 2002
Pakistan's
President Pervez
Musharraf and
Indian leader
Atal Vajpayee
lately have
issued somewhat
conciliatory
statements, but
the
India-Pakistan
confrontation is
far from over.
The forthcoming
visit of Defense
Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld to the
region may
further cool
down things for
a while but the
problem is bound
to prop up again
due to the
nature of the
conflict.
Kashmir, an
overwhelming
Muslim area, is
a disputed land
under the norms
of international
law. India
claims that the
accession letter
of Kashmir's
Hindu Maharaja
in favor of
India in 1948
and its
confirmation by
Kashmir's
elected assembly
in 1953 made it
an integral part
of India,
whereas Pakistan
challenges the
credibility of
the accession
alleging that it
was signed under
duress and that
the assembly,
which confirmed
it, was bogus.
More so, the
British Governor
General accepted
the accession
conditional to
holding of a
plebiscite to
elicit the
opinion of the
Kashmiris. The
vote has never
taken place.
Various
resolutions of
the United
Nations Security
Council
(1948-51)
renewed the call
for plebiscite
after both
Indian and
Pakistani
militaries ran
over the state.
Irrespective of
the fact that
the relevant
U.N. resolutions
were under
Chapter 6
(nonbinding),
the provisions
of the Geneva
Convention
dealing with the
"belligerent
occupation" are
applicable,
which have been
violated by both
the countries in
varying degrees.
According to the
1994 report of
the
International
Commission of
Jurists, "the
right of
self-determination
to which the
people of
Kashmir became
entitled as part
of the partition
has neither been
exercised nor
extinguished,
and thus remains
exercisable
today."
Over the years,
India and
Pakistan fought
three major
wars, in
addition to
numerous limited
armed conflicts
– all of which
meant spending
billions of
dollars to
acquire deadly
weapons at the
cost of economic
development and
progress. There
has been an
annual increase
of 6.2 percent
in the Indian
military
expenditure
during the
period
1947-1999. In
comparison,
Pakistan's per
capita defense
expenditure is
around $26, more
than double that
of India.
Both the states
have linked
Kashmir issue
with their
national
identities in
such an
inextricable
manner that has
made their
standpoints
irreconcilable.
This
narrow-mindedness
has developed
and entrenched a
culture of hate
and animosity
between the
people of the
two countries.
In none of the
nine bilateral
dialogues,
representatives
from Kashmir
were ever
invited or
involved. The
insurgency
starting in
India-controlled
Jammu and
Kashmir in 1989
was an
indigenous one,
as a reaction to
Indian control
and "engineered"
elections. This
is a widely
accepted fact
across the
board. The
"guest"
militants
sponsored by
Pakistani
intelligence
moved in the
theater later
and indeed
damaged the
image of the
movement. In
this context,
Indian hands are
also not clean
as they used
brutal force to
tackle the
uprising,
committing gross
human rights
violations in
the process.
Without
resolution of
the Kashmir
issue, durable
peace in South
Asia is only a
dream. The
United States
can play a very
crucial role in
this scenario,
but it has to do
more than the
"balancing act"
diplomacy. The
public opinion
in both India
and Pakistan is
increasingly
becoming very
critical of the
United States,
as people from
both sides
mistakenly think
that the United
States is taking
the other's
side.
Various
countries in the
region,
including
Russia, China,
Turkey and Iran,
are offering
mediation role
but it is U.S.
interests that
are really at
stake, due to
this instability
and it is their
influence and
leverage which
is the most
significant
factor.
Without a
meaningful
dialogue
supported by
U.S. mediation
leading to a
settlement, the
region will
remain on the
edge of a
catastrophe. The
small U.N.
contingent
already in place
to monitor the
disputed border
should be
expanded to
verify whether
Mr. Musharraf's
promise of a
crackdown on
militants is
really working.
India should
also be told
that it must
improve the
human rights
situation in
Kashmir and sit
at the
negotiation
table. Mr.
Rumsfeld's
intervention
will be
short-lived if
his idea of
détente in South
Asia does not
include these
issues.
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